ValueSpace

Land governance in East Africa: registration, plural tenure and the administrative capacity constraint

Olule Solomon12 min read

Abstract

Land acquisition in East Africa takes place within systems that combine statutory registration with living customary tenure, under land administrations whose capacity is generally below what their statutory mandates assume. This paper examines the consequences of that combination for project land acquisition — records that are incomplete or out of date, parallel recognition systems producing competing claims to the same parcel, and dispute-resolution institutions operating at both statutory and customary levels — and argues that projects consistently underestimate the time and administrative effort acquisition requires.

Land governanceLand administrationLand registrationCustomary tenureEast Africa

1. Plural systems in one jurisdiction

Land tenure across the region is governed by statutory registration operating alongside customary systems that remain the practical basis of holding for most rural land. Statutes generally recognise customary tenure rather than extinguishing it, which is the correct policy position and creates a durable administrative complexity: two systems recognise interests in the same land, with different procedures, different evidence and different institutions.

For an acquiring project this means the register is not a sufficient statement of who holds what. A parcel may be unregistered and fully occupied under arrangements that are locally unambiguous and documentarily invisible.

2. Registers that lag reality

Where registration exists it frequently lags. Transfers occur without registration because the process is costly and distant. Successions are not recorded, so registers name deceased holders while land is held and worked by heirs. Subdivisions happen informally.

The practical consequence is that title searches produce a picture that is legally current and factually historical. A project relying on the register alone acquires from a person who may no longer be the holder, and discovers the actual occupants at possession — which is the worst possible moment.

3. Capacity as the binding constraint

Land administration institutions are typically under-resourced relative to their mandates. Valuation approval, title processing, survey verification and dispute resolution all pass through offices with limited staff and, in many cases, incomplete or partly digitised records.

A project that programmes acquisition on the assumption that statutory timelines are indicative of actual throughput will schedule optimistically. Delay in acquisition then propagates into construction schedule and, since compensation must precede possession, into pressure to take possession before payment is complete — which converts an administrative delay into a compliance failure.

4. Dispute resolution across two systems

Disputes over land in the region are resolved through statutory tribunals and courts and through customary institutions — clan and family structures, local leadership — that continue to carry real authority. The systems are not always in agreement, and a determination in one may be contested in the other.

Projects encounter this when a compensation claim depends on who holds a parcel and the answer differs by forum. Treating the statutory answer as dispositive is legally defensible and practically insufficient, because the party recognised customarily is the party in occupation. Practice that works engages both, records what each determined, and resolves the compensation question with that record rather than by choosing a forum and hoping the other does not assert itself.

References

  1. [1]Compulsory Land Acquisition in Uganda (Policy Briefing Paper 47). Advocates Coalition for Development and Environment (ACODE), 2020.
  2. [2]Uganda legislation — Constitution of the Republic of Uganda (1995) and Land Act (1998). Uganda Legal Information Institute (ULII), 2023.
  3. [3]Good Practice Handbook: Land Acquisition and Involuntary Resettlement. International Finance Corporation, 2023.
  4. [4]Performance Standard 5: Land Acquisition and Involuntary Resettlement. International Finance Corporation, 2012.
  5. [5]Integrated Safeguards System: Policy Statement and Operational Safeguards. African Development Bank Group, 2023.

Related papers